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Abstract
The IACHR is relevant organ in the Inter American System of Human Rights. As was 
foreseeable, it work and powers has caused a significant tension among the state- members 
that has increased in recent years. This tension is due to the clash between two different 
paradigms in international relations, on one hand, the liberalism paradigm that emphasized 
in the idea of cooperation and human rights, and, on the other, the realistic paradigm that is 
focus in the notion of sovereignty and self- interest of the States on the international level. 
Recently, this stress has been growing and a reform process has been opened with the 
purpose to make some changes in the work of the Commission. On one side, the Commission 
and some organizations of the civil society want to preserve their autonomy, independence 
and powers. On the other side, some States want to restrict the powers of the Commission 
and are threatening to block the system. This article tries to address this tension giving to 
the reader some key elements about the context and some perspectives of a process that 
is still ongoing and could implied significant effects to the international protection of human 
rights in the region. 
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Resumen
La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos es un órgano relevante dentro del 
Sistema Interamericano de Protección de derechos Humanos. Como era previsible, su 
trabajo ha causado tensión entre los Estados miembros. Recientemente, esta tensión se 
ha venido incrementando, en parte debido al conflicto entre dos paradigmas diferentes en 
las relaciones internacionales. Por un lado, del paradigma liberal que enfatiza en la idea 
de la cooperación y los Derechos Humanos, y por otro, el paradigma realista que se centra 
en la noción de soberanía y en el propio interés de los Estados en el plano internacional. 
A causa de la creciente tensión entre ambos paradigmas, un proceso de reforma se ha 
abierto con el propósito de hacer algunos cambios en el funcionamiento de la Comisión. 
Por un parte, la Comisión y algunas organizaciones de la sociedad civil pretenden preservar 
su autonomía, independencia y competencias. Por la otra, algunos Estados presenten 
restringir las competencias de la Comisión y han amenazado con bloquear al sistema. Este 
artículo trata de abordar dicha tensión, dando al lector algunos calves sobre el contexto 
y perspectivas sobre el proceso de reforma que aún permanece abierto y que pudiera 
tener serios efectos en la protección internacional de los Derechos Humanos en la región. 
Palabras clave: Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Organización de 
Estados Americanos, Derechos Humanos, Medidas Cautelares, Liberalismo, Realismo. 
Introduction
The Inter- American Commission of Human Rights [Hereinafter “IACHR”] has played and 
plays an important role in the protection of human rights in the region. However, it work 
and powers has caused a significant tension among the state- members that has increased 
in recent years. Because of that, a reform process has been opened with the purpose 
of restring some powers of the Commission. In this reform process a balance should be 
achieve between the sovereignty of the states and the autonomy of the IACHR. The best 
solution should be the one that allow the continuity of the Commission by the states but also 
guarantee in the best way possible the independence that is required for the protection of 
Human Rights. 
The IACHR is an autonomous organ of the Organization of American States whose mission 
is to promote and protect human rights in the American hemisphere. In this sense, the 
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powers of the Commission combine semi- judicial with political functions. Historically, the 
Commission has played an active role in the promotion and defense of the human rights 
especially in the transition processes from authoritarian governments to democracies that 
took place in the continent.
This active role is still ongoing. As in the past, this attitude has created some tensions 
between the Commission and the member states subject to their decisions. However, 
this tension has been growing particularly strongly since the last five years due to the 
discontent that some decision had produced in governments like Venezuela, Ecuador and 
lastly Brazil. Currently the pressure of the states is so strong against the Commission that 
last December the OAS General Assemble decided to open a process to reform some of 
the powers of the Commission among others changes into the Inter- American System of 
Human Rights. 
Although this process was named as a “strengthening process of the Inter- American human 
rights system”, by its objectives and currently proposals by the member states is clear that 
the main goals are to restrict and downgrade some of the powers of the Commission. 
In this sense proposals like limit the use of precautionary measures, regulate the kind 
of statements that the Commission could address to the member states and limit the 
financial resources of the IACHR are good examples of that sense. 
All this situation could be explained under the different conceptions of what the IACHR 
is and more specifically the different perspective in the relationship between this treaty 
organ and their member states. In this sense, the state members seems to be taking 
a position addressed to ensure and protect state sovereignty against the autonomy and 
independence of the Commission in his work and powers. From this perspective, the reform 
of the IACHR will be successful if the final result responds to the sovereign concerns of the 
member states. 
However, this position do not appears to be the most convenient from a progressive human 
rights perspective. In this sense, the autonomy, independence and even counter-majoritarian 
nature of the organs that are responsible for the supervision of human rights are crucial 
in the advance and guarantee for the human rights standards. From this perspective, 
any restriction of the autonomy and independence of the IACHR could be conceived as a 
regression on the protection of the human rights in the region. 
Therefore, the result of the currently reform process of the IACHR will have a significant 
impact into the Inter- American System. The search for a balance between the different 
perspective mention above seems to be necessary and convenient. In this sense, a 
reform that responds to the concerns of the state, and doing that avoids the possibility to 
just withdraw the organization, but also tries to maintain the maximum possible level of 
autonomy of the Commission appears to be the most adequate and convenient decision 
under the current circumstances. 
To develop this analysis, the present paper is divided in three parts. The first one will be 
dedicated to present the IACHR as a treaty organ into the OAS, emphasizing in their powers, 
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functions and the evolution that the Commission has taken since their creation to now 
days. The second part of the paper will be addressed to explain the so called “process of 
strengthening” that is taking place in relation to the work of the Commission. In this sense, 
it will be emphasized the circumstances that conducted to this situation, the parties, their 
interest, the development and the currently stage of the process. The third part will be 
intended to contextualize in a theoretical framework the mentioned process, noting there 
the role played by the human rights in the international relations, the paradigm before 
the international actors, and lastly some possible solutions to overcome the currently 
conjuncture behalf the human rights but also under a “realistic” perspective. Finally, it will 
be presented some preliminary conclusions to this work and also the most relevant and 
troubling questions than remain open into this ongoing process.
The Inter- American Commission of Human Rights: functions and history
The Organization of American States [OAS] is an international organization formally created 
by the States of the Americas in 1948 with the objective to achieve a regional order of 
peace and justice, promote solidarity, and defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
independence based on respect for the “essential rights of man” as is established in the 
OAS Charter1. 
Since the creation of the OAS, the States of the Americas have adopted a series of 
international instruments that have become the normative basis of a regional system for the 
promotion and protection of human rights. Those instruments, jointly with the supervision 
institutions and their decisions, compound the Inter- American System of Human Rights2. As 
part of this system, the Inter- American Commission of Human Rights [IACHR] is a principal 
organ of the OAS whit the explicit mission to promote and protect human rights in the 
American hemisphere3. Formally the Commission was created by the OAS in 1959, but was 
installed with the currently powers only until 1979 when their Statute was approved in the 
ninth regular sessions of the OAS General Assembly in La Paz- Bolivia4.
According to this statute, the IACHR is comprised of seven persons, elected in their personal 
capacity by the General Assembly of the OAS, who shall be persons of high moral character 
1 Organization of American States, Charter of the Organization of American States [OAS Charter]. Signed in Bogotá in 
1948 and amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires in 1967, by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias in 1985, by the 
Protocol of Washington in 1992, and by the Protocol of Managua in 1993, accessed at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
mandate/Basics/charterOAS.asp consulted on; November 19, 2012.
2 Claudio Grossman. “Strengthening the Inter- American Human Rights System: the current debate”, in: American 
Society of International Law, Washington D.C, vol 92, April 1998, p. 186, accessed at: www.jstor.org/stable/25659214 
consulted on: November 19, 2012.
3 Art. 106 OAS Charter and Art. 41 American Convention of Human Rights, accessed at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
mandate/Basics/convention.asp consulted on: November 19, 2012. 
4 Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights. Approved by Resolution 
Nº 447 taken by the General Assembly of the OAS at its ninth regular session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, October 1979, 
accessed at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/statuteiachr.asp consulted on: November 19, 2012.
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and recognized competence and expertise in the field of human rights. They are elected for 
a four-year term, and may be reelected only once. The Commissioners act in their personal 
capacity and therefore do not represent in any case the Organization or their origin States.
According to the OAS Charter and the Statute, it could be hold that the work of IACHR rests on 
three main pillars: (i) Individual petition system; (ii) Monitoring of the human rights situation 
in the Member States, and (iii) Attention devoted to priority thematic areas. 
Regarding the individual petition system, the IACHR has the power to receive, analyze, 
and investigate individual petitions related to violations of human rights. This power could 
be exercised against any Member State of the OAS that had ratified the Inter- American 
Convention of Human Rights5 or even the Inter- American Declaration of Human Rights6. To 
doing that, the Commission has powers to request information from governments concerned 
to investigate the facts in the complaint, collect data and evidence with the parties interested 
and even makes on- site visits to the Member States to conduct an in-depth analysis about 
the specific situation, according to the article 18 of the Statute. 
After the investigation period and if exists merit, the IACHR depending to the international 
obligations assumed by the Member State could, on one hand, make recommendations to 
them to adopt measures that contribute to protecting human rights in the particular situation 
if the State has not recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights7. On the other hand, if the State Member has recognized the jurisdiction of 
the Court, the Commission can submit the case to the Inter-American Court and appears 
before it during the processing and consideration of the case8. In this case, it is possible to 
argue that the Commission has semi- judicial powers because it decide, not only about the 
admissibility of the claim, but also to their merits, and then has the discretion to submit the 
case before the Court. 
In second place and related to the function of monitoring the human rights, the Commission 
has the power to observe the general situation of human rights in the Member States and 
also to publish special reports on the situation in a given Member State when considers 
it appropriate. In addition, the IACHR can receive and examine communications in which 
one State party claims that another State has committed human rights violations against 
5 The non- universality of the Inter- American Convention of Human Rights is a great issue on the Inter- American System 
because the normative standards in the protections of Human Rights differ significantly in both documents. Nowa-
days, nine States have not signed the Convention: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, United States, 
Guyana, San Kitts and Nevis, Sant Lucia, Sant Vicent and the Grenadines.
6 The Inter- American Declaration of Human Rights was signed by all 35 member states of the OAS. 
7 Now days, eleven States have not accepted the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Inter- American Court of Human Rights: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, United States, Guyana, San Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Grenada and Jamaica. 
8 According to the article 61 of the American Convention of Human Rights “Only the States Parties and the Commission 
shall have the right to submit a case to the Court”. 
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the American Convention. In both cases the Commission could recommend to the Member 
States the adoption of measures that contribute to protecting human rights in the countries 
of the hemisphere.
In third place, the IACHR fosters public awareness of human rights in the Americas. To that 
end, the Commission prepares and publishes reports on specific and priority thematic areas. 
Now days, the prioritized topics are related to the effects of internal armed conflicts on 
certain groups; the human rights situation of children, women, migrant workers and their 
families, persons deprived of liberty, human rights defenders, indigenous peoples, afro 
descendants, and persons deprived of liberty; on freedom of expression; citizen security 
and terrorism and their link with human rights, among others. Since 1990, the Commission 
began to create thematic rapporteurships with the purpose to strengthen, promote, and 
systematize the Inter-American Commission’s own work on each of those issues9. 
In summary, it could be hold that since 1979 the IACHR combines two different powers, on 
one side, semi- judicial functions related to the power to investigate individual petition of 
violations of human rights than later could be submitted before the Inter- American Court. 
And, on the other side, some political functions related to the monitoring and promotion the 
observance and protection of the human rights by all Member States of the OAS. 
Since their creation, The IACHR has played an active role in the promotion and defense of 
the human rights in the American continent and therefore had and has been considered as 
a principal organ in the Inter- American System of Human Rights. However, this does not 
mean that the role on the protection of the human rights of the IACHR had been the same 
along their history. Actually, during the existence of the IACHR it could be identified two 
different periods in the role played by the Commission attending to the particular context in 
the continent. 
One first period, could be identified by the prevalence of the political functions of the 
Commission and comprises, more or less, since their creation until the beginning of the 90 s´. 
In this phase, under the National Security doctrine many States in South America, especially 
in the south cone, were under authoritarian or military governments with the excuse to avoid 
the communist threat. During those governments gross and systematic violations of human 
rights took place not only in their own territories but all over the continent. As an example, 
it could be enough naming the “Condor Operation” as an international plan designed and 
executed by some military governments in the region to disappear, murder and torture 
political opponents all around the continent10. 
In this context, the main role played by the Commission´ s was not to try to investigate 
isolated violations, but to document the existence of these gross and systematic violations 
9 Today there are created nine thematic Rapporteurships that in the follow areas: Rights to indigenous people, women, 
migrant workers and their families, freedom of expression, of the child, rights defenders, persons deprived of liberty, 
afro- descendants and against racial discrimination, and one unit on the rights of LGTBI people. 
10 Patrice J. McSherry. “Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter- American System”, in: Social Justice, San Francisco, Vol. 26, 
1999, p. 144, accessed at: http://www.public.asu.edu/~idcmt/terror.pdf consulted on: November 19, 2012.
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and to exercise pressure to improve the general conditions of human rights in the country 
concerned. In this sense, the judicial powers were put in second place and all the political 
powers were addressed to denounce the abuses of the authoritarian governments, thus, 
visits in loco, investigations, publication of report of each country and their presentation 
to the General Assemble of the OAS and to the press, were the main actions took it by the 
Commission in those times. The strategy was clear: to prioritize the need to establish and 
to publicize what was happening and to seek change by pressure and negotiation through 
the political organs of the OAS and the mass media, rather than through adverse ruling in 
petition cases.
The role played by the Commission during this period achieved significant effect in the 
national and international sphere. In this sense, David Harris asserts that “The Inter 
American Commission´ s report have acted as a catalyst or had some other beneficial effect. 
A vivid example was the 1980 report that brought home to people in Argentina the record 
of their military government on disappeared persons in the late 1970 s´. Such effect as the 
Commission´ s reports have achieved has not been with the backing of the General Assembly 
of the OAS.”11 Also, Maria Chirstina Cerna considers that “Since many countries in the region 
were under military dictatorships, the Commission carried out in- site investigations and 
prepared country studies on large scale violations, such as the systematic practice of torture 
or forced disappearances. […] The main contribution of the Inter- American Commission 
during this period was toward the delegitimization of military dictatorship in the hemisphere, 
which facilitated the return of democracy governments”12. Therefore, it could be hold 
that the Commission played a principal role in the transitional process from authoritarian 
governments to democracies that took place in relevant number of American countries, and 
in part due to their job, at least at the beginnings of the 90 s´ the military regimens were part 
of the history in America. 
A second period, could be identified since the ends of the 80 s´ until now days. Before weak 
but at least democratic government operating in the most countries in the continent, the 
Commission jointly with the political functions put an especial accent in their quasi- judicial 
powers. Thereon, the Commission started to investigate individual claims of violations of 
human rights, made statements of the merits of those petitions and when considered to 
exist enough evidence and relevance submitted the cases before the Inter- American Court 
of Justice for a definitive ruling. 
This new role of the IACHR was indisputable since April 1986 when the Commission 
presented the first three contentious cases before the Inter- American Court concerning the 
forced disappearance of four individuals in Honduras committed by security forces officials. 
The actions took it by the Commission originated the famous case knew as the Velasquez 
11 Stephen Livingstone (Ed), The Inter- American system of Human Rights. New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 12.
12 Christina M. Cerna, “The Inter- American System for the Protection of Human Rights”, in: American Society of 
International Law, Washington D.C, Vol. 95, 2001, p. 76.
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Rodriguez case13, where the Court rule in the sense presented by the Commission and the 
State was found responsible for several violations of Inter- American Convention of Human 
Rights. Until today, this case is still considered as a landmark decision into the framework 
of State liability for violations of human rights under their jurisdiction and also “is cited 
frequently for its major contribution to the advancement of international law”14.
After those initial cases, through this work the Commission has addressed and developed 
relevant and always controversial topics related to the violations of human rights in the region, 
for example, the Commission has triggered the nullification of the effects of laws that provided 
amnesty in relation to grave violations of human rights committed by dictatorships and 
authoritarian governments15; has established the standards for participation of indigenous 
people in the determination of their rights16; and has recognized and denounced crimes 
against humanity committed in America stemming from patterns of forced disappearances, 
torture and sexual violence17.
In this sense and regarding to the new role, it could be hold that “The Commission converted 
itself into an accusatory agency, a kind of hemispheric grand jury, storming around Latin 
America to vacuum up evidence of high crimes and misdemeanors and marshaling it into 
bills of indictment in to the form of country reports for delivery to the political organs of the 
OAS and the Inter- American Court”18.
Despite the periods of the works of the Commission as an organ of the Inter- American 
System, is clear that the IACHR has played and plays an important role in the protection 
of human rights in the region. Not only as a political actor, monitoring and promoting the 
observance of the human rights all over the continent, but also as a quasi- judicial organ 
that has develop an essential role in the judgment and prosecution of the state liability for 
violations of human rights. 
13 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Velázquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, 
Series C No. 4, accessed at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/40279a9e4.pdf consulted on November 19, 
2012.
14 Juan E. Méndez. Taking Stand: The evolution of Human Rights. New York, Palgrave Mcmillan, 2011, p. 101. 
15 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of March 14, 2001. Series C 
No. 75, accessed at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_75_ing.pdf consulted on: November 19, 
2012.
16 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People. v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007 Series C No. 172, accessed at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
docs/casos/articulos/seriec_172_ing.pdf consulted on: November 19, 2012.
17 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 
27, 1998. Series C No. 42, accessed at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_42_ing.pdf 
18 Tom Farer, “The rise of the Inter- American Human Rights Regime: No longer a Unicorn, Nor Yet an Ox”, in David J. Harris, 
Stephen Livingstone, Ed. The Inter- American system of Human Rights. New York, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 32. 
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The current “strengthening” process of the Inter- American Commission 
of Human Rights
The work of the Commission has not been immune from critics and tensions with the Member 
States, especially with the recipients of the measures adopted by the IACHR. This tension 
and resistance to the work of the Commission already took place in the past and conducted, 
in most extreme cases and by the end of the 90 s´, to the withdrawal of Trinidad and Tobago 
from the Inter- American Convention to shield its death penalty from the Commission and 
Court scrutiny and Peru´ s short- lived intended withdrawal in the same decade as a reaction 
to the measures adopted by the IACHR under the Alberto Fujimori regime.
However, in the last five years this resistance to the Inter- American System of Human Rights, 
and especially to the work of the Commission, has been growing with special strength. 
Thereon, Member States with great relevance in the Inter- American System as Ecuador, 
Venezuela and lastly Brazil, among others, have been expressing their discontent and unrest 
with some positions and decisions adopted by the IACHR and therefore have stated the 
necessity to develop some reforms to the powers of the Commission particularly.
As examples, the government of the President Rafael Correa in Ecuador has criticized 
vigorously the work of the Commission in two different aspects. First, some decisions took it 
by the Commission jointly with the Inter- American Court related to indigenous communities 
which both organs recognized the collective right that those communities have to be 
consulted by the government previously to any economical interventions on their ancestral 
and collective territories19. In the concept of the President Correa this decision constitute a 
violation of the national sovereign of the State and a transgression of the powers conferred 
to the Commission by the Inter- American Convention, because in the judgment both organ 
equated the right to “previous consultation”, that is in the Convention, with a new requisite 
to “previous consent”20. Second, the Ecuadorian Government has criticized the work of the 
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Commission due to strong warnings 
that this office has made in favor of journalists and mass media for the violation of the 
freedom of speech committed by the State. Those actions by the Commission has conducted 
to the President Correa refers to this Special Rapporteurship as the “spokeswoman of the 
businesses engaged in the communications”21. 
19 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case Pueblo indigena Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits and reparations. 
Judgment of June 27 of 2012. Serie C No. 245. Accessed at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm?idCaso=388 
consulted on November 19, 2012.
20 About this issue the President Correa explicitly said that “Please, a little more of responsibility, a little more of respect 
to the sovereign of ours countries, a little more respect to the normative in the Convention, that gives the functions to 
the Inter- American Convention [sic] the power to promote the Human Rights but not a pseudo- ecological terrorism”. 
Ecuador, Presidencia de la República, Public Intervention in the 42 General Assembly of the OAS, Cochabamba- Bolivia, 
June 4 of 2012. p 20. Accessed at: http://www.presidencia.gob.ec/discursos-e-intervenciones consulted: Novermber 
19, 2012.
21 Ibid. p. 9. 
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Meanwhile the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with Mr. Hugo Chavez 
as President also has criticized and resisted to the work of the IACHR22. To the Venezuelan 
government, the Commission in some recent cases - related to political opponents and where 
has been protected their rights to freedom of expression, due process and access to justice23- 
has transgressed, on one hand, the scope and powers attributed to the Commission, and on 
the other hand, the constitutional regime enforce in Venezuela. In this sense, has considered 
explicitly that “The Commission has not acted with objectivity and transparency, violating the 
spirit of the Convention by sponsoring impunity, particularly of those individuals involved in 
the events of April 2002 coup, as well as in the business and oil strike of December 2003. 
Have manipulated international law to remove the guilt to the violators of our laws, and make 
them victims of unfounded false violations of their human rights”24. 
And finally, since 2011 the government of Brazil became part to the group of critics of the role 
played by the Commission. In April of this year, the IACHR imposed precautionary measures 
in favor of some indigenous communities that inhabit the area where a huge dam will be 
built in the Amazon jungle and therefore ordered the immediate suspension of the project. 
The arguments of the Commission where clear, again the obligation to perform previous 
consultations with the indigenous communities that will be affected by the development 
of the project in accordance with the American Convention on Human Rights and the 
jurisprudence of the Inter- American System was not accomplished, and then the licensing 
process of the project should be immediately suspended25. 
The reactions of rejection to this measure by the Brazilian government were notable26. First, 
in an official note, the Minister of International Affairs of Brazil expressed the “perplexity” 
of their government with the measure and considered it as “hasty and unexplained”27. 
Second, the Brazilian government called for consultations the ambassador of Brazil before 
the OAS, Mr. Ruy Casaes. Third, the government retired the Brazilian candidate to the IACHR 
in substitution to the former Brazilian Commissioner Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro. Fourth, 
ordered the suspension of contributions to the OAS, and therefore to the Commission, 
22 Juan E. Méndez. Op. cit. p. 105.
23 Among others, Case Perozo and others v. Venezuela; Case Brewer Carías v. Venezuela; case Díaz Peña v. Venezuela. 
Quoted in: Venezuela, Presidencia de la República, Notification of denunciation of the American Convention of Human 
Rights by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. September 6, 2012. p. 10 and further. 
24 Ibid. p. 11.
25 Inter- American Commission of Human Rights, Letter MC-382-10, Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, 
Pará- Brazil. April 1, 2011, accessed at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/protection/precautionary.asp 
consulted on: November 19, 2012.
26 Paulo Sotero. “The Brazilian Challenge: how to manage asymmetrical regional relations beyond the OAS”, in: CIDOB 
Review d a´fers internacionals, Barcelona, vol. 97-98, April 2012, p. 101- 116.
27 “Brasil protesta contra pedido de comissao da OEA sobre Belo Monte”. UOL Noticias Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, April 5, 
2011, accessed at: http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/afp/2011/04/05/brasil-protesta-contra-pedido-de-
comissao-da-oea-sobre-belo-monte.jhtm consulted on: November 19, 2012.
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with the excuse of the necessity to contain national costs, suspension that took place until 
December of 2011. And last but not least, the government of Dilma Rousseff pointed out 
to the others State Members the necessity to open a process to revise and look over the 
currently operation of the Inter- American System of Human Rights and specially the work 
of the IACHR.
The effects of the critics by this group of Members States to the Inter- American System and 
especially to the role played by the Commission created immediate and diverse consequences. 
The most extreme course of action was took it by the Venezuelan government who decided 
to denounced the American Declaration of Human Rights and therefore withdraw to the 
Inter- American System of Human Rights. This decision was took it on September of 2012 
and the reasons includes that “The Inter American Commission and the Court have moved 
away to the sacred principles that they should protect, becoming in a political throwable 
weapon used to destabilize some governments, especially ours [Venezuela], taking the trend 
to interfere with internal issues of our government”28. 
On the other side and due in part to the political weight that Brazil has in the Inter- American 
System, a process addressed to revise and look over the work of the system of Human Rights 
was started ordered by the General Assembly of the OAS. Despite it was obvious from the 
context that the process was guided to debilitate the Commission restringing their powers 
and their autonomy, paradoxically, the name gave to it was “The process of strengthening of 
the Inter- American System for the protection of Human Rights”. 
In this sense, on June 29, 2011, the OAS Permanent Council established a Special Working 
Group composed by some ambassadors of the State Members to the OAS. On December 
13, 2011, this group issued 53 recommendations to the IACHR, 13 to the member states 
and one to the OAS Secretary General related the operation of the Human Rights System29. 
The Report of the Special Working Group was then adopted by the Permanent Council on 
January 25, 2012 and ratified by the OAS General Assembly on June 5 of 201230. The 
recommendations focused its attentions on the following topics: (i) Precautionary measures; 
(ii) procedural matters in processing cases and individual petitions; (iii) Friendly settlements; 
(iv) Criteria of constructing the annual reports of the IACHR about the development of Human 
Rights in the region; (v) Promotion of Human Rights, and (vi) The financial situation of the 
Inter American System of Human Rights. 
28 Nicolás Maduro Moros. Op. Cit. At .2.
29 Report of the Special Working group to Reflect on the Working of the inter- American Commission in Human Rights 
with a view to Strengthening the Inter- American Human Rights System for consideration by the Permanent Council, 
OEA/Ser.G, GT/SIDH-13/ 11 rev., December 13, 2011.
30 Resolution of the OAS General Assembly adopted at the fourth plenary session held on June 5, 2012, AG/RES.2761 
(XLII-O/12), “Follow- up of the recommendations of the “Report of the Special Working group to Reflect on the 
Working of the inter- American Commission in Human Rights with a view to Strengthening the Inter- American 
Human Rights System”. 
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During this process, the IACHR by their own started a process to consultation with the purpose 
to know the position of the civil society organizations, victims of human rights violations 
and academics about the called “strengthening process”. On October 23, 2012, the IACHR 
published a reply to the Permanent Council of the OAS regarding the recommendations 
contained in the Report of the Special Working Group to reflect on the Working of the IACHR 
and adopted by the General Assemble of the OAS31. 
Due to the restriction of space and the scope of the present paper, it will not be possible to 
present and analyze each of the issues and recommendations made by the States and the 
Special Working Group, the position adopted by the General Assembly and the response by 
the IACHR. For these reasons and as an indicator of the rest of them, it will be selected and 
analyzed one of the most controversial topics in this process of revision: the legality of the 
powers of the Commission to impose precautionary measures to the Member States. To do 
this, it will be exposed normative support of this power, the position of some member states 
and the IACHR about it, and finally the position adopted by the General Assembly and the 
response by the Commission. 
To start taking about precautionary measures, it is necessarily begin saying that the article 
63.2 of the American Convention of Human Rights established the power to the Inter- 
American Court to impose precautionary measures, but said nothing about this possibility by 
the IACHR. This power is just established in the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, rules that 
were approved by the Commission itself and not in an international treaty like the Convention.
This starting point and context explained above, has opened a debate about the legality of 
those kinds of powers that are not worthless at all as was presented above. In this regard 
are two opposite positions. On one side, there is the position of the IACHR itself and other 
Human Rights Organizations that defend the legality and legitimacy of the powers to request 
precautionary measures to the Members States. Regard to the legality, the Commission 
adopting the doctrine of “implied powers”32 considers that- this power “emanates from the 
IACHR’s function of overseeing the implementation of the commitments assumed by the 
States parties, established in Article 18 of the Commission’s Statute and Article 41 of the 
American Convention, and it rests on the general obligation of the States to respect and 
ensure human rights (Article 1.1 of the American Convention), to adopt the legislative or 
other measures necessary to give effect to human rights (Article 2), and to carry out the 
obligations contracted pursuant to the Convention and the OAS Charter in good faith”33.
31 Inter- American Commission of Human Rights, “Reply to the Permanent Council on Process of Strengthening of the 
System”, accessed at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/strengthening/respuesta.asp consulted on: November 19-20-12
32 Apparently in the most flexible and wide of this doctrine meaning that an international organization and/or it organs 
have all the powers that are essential to the performance of its duties. About it: Jan Klabbers. An Introduction to 
International Institutional Law. London, Cambridge University Press. 2009. p. 69.
33 Inter- American Commission of Human Rights, “Reply to the Permanent Council on Process of Strengthening of the 
System”, p. 18 FN 60.
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On the other side, there is the position of some Member States which consider that under 
the doctrine of “attributed powers”34, the no explicit attribution of powers on the Inter- 
American Convention or in any other treaty precluded any decision about precautionary 
measures by the Commission. In this sense, the Ecuadorian government has said that “The 
Inter- American Commission, by the Rules of Procedure made by them, arrogated to itself 
powers that are not established on the Statute”35. 
Despite the opposite considerations about the legality of those powers, the position adopted 
by the Special Working Group and then by the General Assembly by the OAS it seems 
to be intermediate between them. First, the common document for those organs begins 
making an implicit recognition of the power that assist the IACHR to impose precautionary 
measures because they establish explicitly that “the system of precautionary measures 
of the IACHR has been and continues to be of practical value and usefulness”36. Second, 
with the idea to give greater clarity to this system, the document recommends the strict 
observance of the parameter used by the Commission to the imposition of this kind of 
measures and the necessity to disseminate the criteria uses to do that, but also warns 
the document “without impairing its ultimate purpose of requesting prompt protection for 
persons in circumstances that warrant it”37. In other words, the General Assembly after the 
recognition to the powers to the Commission to impose precautionary measures pretends 
to reduce the discretionality in their use. 
Regard to these recommendations, the IACHR expressed their agreement and they will 
undertake to develop and subsequently publish a digest that systematize and explain the 
standards set in precautionary measures and the best practices about it. In this sense, 
the Commission recognizes the importance of disseminate and incorporate these strict 
criteria in the future analyses for granting or lifting such measures. Thus, the Commission 
accepts to restrict part of their own autonomy and independence, at least for the sake of 
predictability of their decisions and restrict the legal insecurity in their actions, to maintain 
the support of the General Assembly. 
From a general perspective, this is the same pattern followed by the General Assembly regard 
the other issues recommended to the Commission. It is the interest to regulate and make 
predictable and reduce the legal insecurity through parameters and criteria the actions that in 
the future will be taken by the Commission. Despite this strategy implies a kind of restriction 
34 Under this doctrine the “international organizations, and their organs, can only do those things for which they are 
empowered”. Jan Klabbers. Op. Cit. p 64. 
35 Rafael Correa. Op. Cit. p. 16. 
36 Inter- American Commission of Human Rights ,“Report of the Special Working Group to reflect on the Working of the 
Inter- American Commission on Human Rights with a View to Strengthening the Inter. American Human Rights System 
for Consideration to the Permanent Council”. OEA/Ser.G, GT/SIDH-13/ 11 rev., December 13, 2011 p. 10, accessed at: 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/strengthening.asp consulted on: November 19, 2012.
37 Ibid. p.10.
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of the autonomy and independence of the IACHR, it is not too severe at the end because it is 
the Commission itself who will be establishing the parameters to their future work and doing 
she could continue with her work and with the support of the General Assembly.
A preliminary evaluation of the “strengthening” process of the IACHR 
and some perspectives
Since 1945 the idea of human rights has been spread all over the world. One fact in this 
sense is the multiplicity of international declarations, covenants, conventions and treaties 
celebrated by the states and related to human rights since the end of the Second World 
War. However the implications of this apparent consensus about human rights are still 
uncertain. In words of Michael Ignatieff, “We are scarcely aware of the extent to which 
our moral imagination has been transformed since 1945 by the grown of a language and 
practice of moral universalism, expressed above all in a shared human rights culture”38. 
In this dynamic, the international sphere has not been an exception. Today, the effects 
of the recognition and protection of human rights in the international relations are more 
evident. In one way, most States are becoming to be more inclined to act on behalf of human 
rights because “while States retain most of their sovereign functions, their legitimacy is no 
longer exclusively conditioned by the contract with the Nation, but also by the adherence 
to a set of nations- transcending human rights ideals”39. In the other way, the International 
Organizations itself are using more decisively the legitimacy of human rights and democracy 
as criteria into the decision- making processes40. Therefore, it could be hold without any 
doubt that human rights have an important role to play in the future development of the 
international institutional law. 
However this development was not and will not be pacific and exempt of tensions in the 
international sphere and especially with the states. To understand this, it is necessary to 
remember, at least, the three main elements of the nature of human rights41. First, that the 
individual is the holder of the right. Second, that the State is the bound party to recognize 
and protect the scope of the right to the holder. And third, the possibility to claim before an 
authority to protect the scope of the right, which is called, the justiciability of the rights. Just 
with the mention of those elements, it is clear that the idea of human rights could clash, 
and in fact does continuously, with the self- interest, sovereignty and security of the States 
in the international field. 
38 Michael Ignatieff. The Warrior´ s Honor: Ethic War and the Modern Conscience. New York, Metropolitan, 1997, p. 8. 
39 Daniel Levy; Natan Sznaider, “Sovereignty transformed: a sociology of human rights”, In: The British Journal of 
Sociology, London, vol. 57, Issue, 4, 2006, p. 657.
40 As an example of how human rights and democracy has become into a criteria to the admission and exclusion of States 
to International Organizations see: Alison Duxbury. The participation of States in International Organizations: The role 
of Human Rights and Democracy. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 311- 317. 
41 About the structure of rights, see: W. Hohfeld. Fundamental Legal Conceptions, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1919. 
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Thus, the recognition and protection of human rights implies the idea of a new paradigm 
in the international relations among States. This paradigm has been identified by some 
authors with the term “liberalism”42 and start considering that individuals, international 
organizations and states are subjects in the international relations leaving behind the 
state- centric idea in the international community. In this sense, “liberalism contends that 
people and the countries that represent them are capable of finding mutual interests and 
cooperating to achieve them, at least in part by working through international organizations 
and according to international law”43. Liberals are also prone to think that all humans have 
common bonds that can draw on to identify themselves beyond the narrow boundaries of 
their country, and the ownership of human rights is a good example of those bonds. Hence, 
it could be hold that “The core idea of liberalism centers on respect for personal moral 
rights, based above all on the equal worth of the individuals, whose preference should be 
followed in the public domain”44 
With the foregoing, it is clear that this new international paradigm contrast with the realism 
theory in international relations. Under this paradigm the decisive dynamic among countries 
is a struggle for power in an effort by each to preserve or, preferably, improve its security 
and economic welfare in the international anarchic arena. Realism see this struggle as 
a zero-sum game45, one in which a gain for one country is inevitably a loss for others. In 
this sense, a realist was not moved by ideals, sentiments or justice, only by hard- headed 
calculations of power and security for and by the State. Consequently, ideas like discretion, 
sovereign, non- intervention, security and national interest are the parameters in a realist 
perspective of the international relations.
Despite of the fact that the notion of human rights is increasing their acceptance all over 
the world, it would be just wrong consider that the idea of state sovereignty and therefore 
the realist paradigm has disappear in the theory and the practice of the international 
affairs. Although the recent erosion of the concept of sovereignty, the sovereign- state logic 
is still the main character, the state consent continues still maters and the realism is also 
the most widespread practice in the international arena. Therefore, it could be hold that 
the international human rights are here to stay but so is state sovereignty and the relevant 
issue is to figure out how to unlock the zero- sum equation between them.
Whether and how far human rights issues should be pushed in the expenses of traditional 
security and economic concerns of each state is today a classic dilemma due to the 
clash of liberalism and realism. Foreign policy is inescapably about the management 
42 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in international relations. New York, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 
2006. p. 3
43 John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage. New York, Twelfth Edition, Mc Graw Hill, 2007. p. 23. 
44 David P. Forsythe, Op. Cit. p. 33
45 John T. Rourke. Op. Cit. p. 20.
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of contradictions, meaning that “policy makers will frequently find it necessary in strike 
compromises between advancement of human rights and that of other perceived public 
good”46. Thus, find some balancing between realism and liberalism and how to solve the 
tension between them should be the main focus on the currently discussion of human rights 
and international relations.
With this purpose, it is reveling identify two different levels of tensions between both 
paradigms. One level refers to the question of what or which human rights bind the State 
under the international sphere. For that, the State consent to which human rights is liable 
for and with which scope. This is the case of the massive ratifications of substantive human 
rights instruments like declarations, covenants and conventions made by the states that took 
place in the second half of the past century all over the world. Usually those international 
norms take the form of “soft law”, meaning that their mandatory status is at least limited to 
the states. In this situation, the tension level between liberalism and realism is lower because 
at the end and regard to the implementation of those norms the state remains being the 
judge and jury because there is no superior authority that can impose their enforcement47. 
The second level of tension is higher and refers to the idea of “who” in the international field 
can ensure the observance of human rights. In other words, in this case, the state submits 
itself to an authoritative international mean of supervision and enforcement of the human 
rights standards previously accepted. This is the case which a state assumes and accepts 
voluntarily the adjudication of jurisdiction to an international court or tribunal for future and 
generic cases to make judgments on issues related to alleged violations of the human rights 
by their own citizens and territory. Thus, the tension level is significant higher to the case 
presented earlier and also permanent because is obviously foreseeable the adoption of 
decisions that could be consider in some cases juxtaposed to the self- interest of the state. 
These two different levels of tensions could explain the gap between recognition and 
protection of human rights. In other words, there could be a possible answer to the 
question of how could the rhetoric of human rights be so globally pervasive while the 
politics of human rights is so utterly weak48, could be answer saying that is because 
the enforcement actions of human rights usually suppose acting against the immediate 
interest of the states. In other words, “[a] strong international legal regime for human 
rights cost something in national discretion”49. As a result, the realistic paradigm explains 
in the international level, at least in part, the differential development between recognition 
and protection of human rights. 
46 David P. Forsythe. Op. Cit. p. 16.
47 About the concept of “soft law” in international Human Rights law, see: Ibid. p. 12.
48 Camiel Kenneth, “The recent History of Human Rights”, In: American Historical Review, Bloomington, vol. 109, 2004, at 18. 
49 David P. Forsythe. Op. Cit. p. 38.
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This function of judicial review in human rights issues is commonly assumed by international 
organizations, particularly in organizations with regional scope50. Therefore, the mentioned 
tension usually shifts from the supervision organs to the organization as a whole, making 
visible there the complex relationship between the organization and its members states. 
Currently, in those supervision organs and their international organizations is taking place 
the biggest disputes regarding to the advancement of the human rights against the realistic 
paradigm, been the results still uncertain51. 
Precisely, is in this context where might be located the currently dynamic of the Inter- American 
System of Human Rights. To start, in the American continent the idea of an effective human 
rights system is not yet consolidated because the gap that exist between the recognition of 
human rights and its mechanism of international protection is still significant. As was said 
before, despite all the thirty five States ratified the Inter- American Declaration of Human 
Rights, nine have not signed yet the Inter- American Convention where the mechanisms of 
protection are established. Therefore, the paradigm of realism is still relevant in the dynamic 
of the states in America and moreover about the international human rights issues. 
Likewise, in the reform process that is taking place in the IACHR it could be also identified 
the roles and paradigms in dispute. On one hand, there is the IACHR who clearly has played 
a relevant role as a supervisor organ of the observance of the human rights standards into 
the OAS. Their actions has been inspired under the liberalism perspective where the goal to 
ensure the observance of human rights by the states and behalf the individuals have been 
constant. Under this perspective, the autonomy and independence of the Commission to 
political pressure and to the interference of the member states will be not only convenient 
and preferable but also necessary because those are guarantee of the impartiality in their 
decisions and also ensure the anti- majority nature of rights52. 
In this reasoning, the IACHR and some civil society organizations seek a system that will be 
flexible, open and progressive. About the issues that emerged during the reform process 
their position will be, as an example, in defense of the precautionary measures and their 
complete flexibility in their application; in resistance to any regulation by the member 
states to the content and the scope of the report made by the Commission; and require the 
absolute sufficiency and independence in the management of the budget of the Commission 
to develop their work. 
50 Janusz Symonides (Ed), International protection, monitoring and enforcement of Human Rights. London, Unesco 
2003, p. 165.
51 A good example of those disputes is the Kadi case before the European Court of Human Rights. Among other 
interpretations, this case could be interpreted as the tension between the human rights perspective between the 
realism that characterize the war against terrorism. Precisely, this case conceded, until today, a partial victory to 
human rights perspective. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, September 3, 2008, Cases C-402/05 
and C-415/05. 
52 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v (2011) "Rights", accessed at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2011/entries/rights/ consulted on: November 11, 2012.
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Although, the work of the Commission as an international authority in the protection of 
human rights, has caused and continue causing strong tensions with the member states 
subject to their powers53. This because some member states have considered contrary to 
their self- interests some decision took it by the Commission and appeal to their sovereignty 
to disclaim it. In this behavior is evident the leading of the realistic paradigm, where the 
self- interest and the sovereignty of the State should ruling their actions on the international 
level. This conduct could be identified in the actions regard to the IACHR of states such as 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Brazil with different intensity. 
In this reasoning, those member states claim for a rigid, formal and strict system that will be 
predictable and restricted in their actions, in other words, that provide legal security to the 
states members. For example, they request for the prohibition of the use of precautionary 
measures because those are not explicitly consented by the signatory states of the 
Inter- American System, or at least, them should be regulated and restricted to the most 
exceptional cases. Also, claim for the necessity to regulate the way that the reports of the 
Commission are made and to require the previous consultation and consent of each state 
to the content of the reports. In the same way, they request for the convenience of the strict 
approval for the members states to the budget and their destination of the Commission. 
Finally, if any of those demands are not adopted, the member state could always block the 
implementations of the decision of the system and, as the last resort, just withdraw to the 
Inter- American System54. 
As is evident, from the most extreme positions of both perspectives the result is a zero- sum 
equation where any agreement is impossible to achieve and only one part can win. In this 
scenario, the remaining relevance of the principle of sovereignty of the states would make 
foreseeable the prevalence of the realistic perspective, including the withdraw option from 
the System. Without any doubt, this is the worst possible result to the development of the 
human rights and obviously to the Inter- American System of Human Rights due, on one 
side, to the rupture with the principle of universalism of human rights and to the block effect 
caused to the system. On the other side, there is the lost of legitimacy by the outgoing state 
in the international sphere55 with the denial to their people of a relevant international judicial 
remedy for violations of human rights.
As presented above, this is the currently situation for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
who recently decided to denounce and withdraw to the Inter- American Convention of Human 
Rights, and therefore, to the most significant part of the powers of the Commission and 
also of the Court. As was just said, this is the worst possible scenario from a human rights 
53 In the words of Claudio Grossman, “[…] because the system is under constant threat of “reform” its possibilities of 
mobilizing support against mass and gross violations or ensuring enforcement are reduced, since the system itself is 
“being review” and its legitimacy questioned”. Claudio Grossman. Op. Cit. p. 191. 
54 This possibility is explicitly established in the article 78 of the Inter- American Convention of Human Rights.
55 In this sense, David Forsythe said that “Accepting human rights is the best way to legitimate power”. David P. Forsythe, 
Op. Cit. p. 9. 
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perspective and especially to states that somehow already make part of the Inter- American 
System. The loss for the System is also clear, by the restriction of the universality of their 
powers and measures and by the precedent created to other countries, making that the 
system become weaker that it was. Therefore, this option of possible withdraws should be 
avoided by any possible mean to preserve the System. 
In this point, the question is now how far the System, and especially the organs, should 
concede to the unrest member states to avoid the possibility to withdraw the System and 
doing this, avert the sum-cero result. The key issue will remain in identify the essence of 
the mechanism that without them it will not be able to achieve their purpose. Therefore, the 
System could only confer until to cause harm to the essence of the System. And without 
any doubt, the autonomy and independence of the organ that supervises and monitor the 
observance of human rights are part of that essential core. However, those values admit 
levels of interventions until became meaningless. Therefore, explore this thin line and 
choose a point that balance the interest both of the upset states and the system without the 
denial of the values of autonomy and independence, seems to be the right solution to this 
conjuncture. 
Actually, this seems what the Special Working Group did and also the position took it by 
the General Assembly of the OAS when approved these recommendations to the IACHR. 
As was explained above, from a general point of view, those recommendations recognized 
the relevance of the autonomy and independence of the Commission but also tried to 
restrict them to the point to improve their predictability but not abnegate their existence. 
Consequently, the claims of the unrest states were took it into account and the role and 
essence of the Commission and the System is still there, and the most important, the system 
is preserved and functioning. 
Although is true that this is not the ideal solution to the System, compare to what was 
achieve and the seriousness of the risk, from a strategic and political point of view it is a 
good enough solution. It should be never forgotten that the Inter- American System was 
and is still design by the States as part to an international organization that responds to an 
intergovernmental logical. Therefore, expect something different to this perspective it will be 
hardly possible in the current circumstances. Or maybe there is time to start taking seriously 
that the basis for the international supervision and protection of the Human Rights should 
not depends on the will of the states because its grounds rests possibly in a universal moral 
consensus. If it is so, our analysis should take us to quite different solutions but we are not 
there yet. 
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Conclusion
The IACHR has played and plays an important role in the protection of human rights in the 
region. However, as was foreseeable it work and powers has caused a significant tension 
among the state- members that has increased in recent years. This tension is due to the clash 
between two different perspectives in international relations, on one hand, the liberalism 
paradigm that emphasized in the idea of cooperation and human rights. And, on the other, 
the realistic paradigm that is focused in the notion of sovereignty and self- interest of the 
States on the international level.
Recently, this stress has been growing and a reform process has been opened with the 
purpose to make some changes in the work of the Commission. On one side, the Commission 
and some organizations of the civil society want to preserve their autonomy, independence 
and powers. On the other side, some States want to restrict the powers of the Commission 
and are threatening to block the system. In fact, during this process the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela decided to withdraw to the Inter- American Convention of Human Rights and 
therefore to the protection means of the system.
In this complex context, the General Assembly of the OAS has taken an intermediate position, 
trying to preserve the autonomy and independence of the Commission but regulating some 
of their powers making them predictable to the subject states. Precisely, in the currently 
stage of the process the General Assembly made some recommendation to the Commission 
and the way that these will be implemented is still pending. However, as it is foreseeable, 
this crisis is not over and big risks to the whole System are still prowling. 
Therefore, decisions as the one took it by Venezuela are clearly the most harmful to the 
System and must be avoided. Some balance should be found between the sovereignty of 
the states and the complete autonomy of the IACHR and doing that, preserve the System 
and their essence. In this sense, the recommendations made by the General Assembly 
seem to be adequate and sufficient to solve the crisis, and also the Commission stated their 
agreement with the majority of them. 
However, in this stage of the process is not possible to know the final position of the group 
of the upset states and some rumors could make it think that some other changes are 
wanted by them. But concede more space to the discretion to the States will make not 
only meaningless the independence and autonomy of the Commission and the System as a 
whole, but also the essence of the human rights itself in the Americas. 
An ApproAch to the reform process to the Inter-AmerIcAn commIssIon of humAn rIghts:
context, development And perspectIves to An ongoIng process
Alejandro Gómez-Velásquez
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